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Ostrom amongst the Machines:
Blockchain as a Knowledge Commons
Herminio Bodon, Pedro Bustamante, Marcela Gomez, Prashant
Krishnamurthy, Michael Madison, Ilia Murtazashvili, Jennifer
Murtazashvili, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Martin Weiss1

Abstract
Blockchains are distributed ledger technologies that allow the recording of any data structure,
including money, property titles, and contracts. In this paper, we suggest that Hayekian political
economy is especially well suited to explain how blockchain emerged, but that Elinor Ostrom’s
approach to commons governance is particularly useful to understand why blockchain anarchy
is successful. Our central conclusions are that the blockchain can be thought of as a
spontaneous order, as Hayek anticipated, as well as a knowledge commons, as Ostrom’s
studies of self-governance anticipated.

Introduction
Blockchains sprang into existence in 2008 with the introduction of Bitcoin. One of the most
innovative features of Bitcoin is its core technology, the blockchain (Nakamoto, 2008). A
blockchain is a distributed and shared ledger, where all transactions (i.e., committed entries in a
database) in the ledger are stored in a chain of blocks. This chain is ever-growing as new
transactions occur, in a network of connected nodes, and are appended to it through the
creation of blocks containing multiple transactions. Several broad themes emerged as people
engaged more deeply with Bitcoin, including that the underlying technology (blockchains) had
utility beyond digital currency, that blockchain was a philosophy as much as a technology and
that there were many distinct forms of blockchains, each of which have a unique set of
technical, economic, and social characteristics.
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The concept of “alternative” forms of currencies such as cryptocurrencies has gained a
lot of attention not only in academia but also in the government and business domain. Bitcoin is
without a doubt one of the main reasons for its popularity. The Bitcoin platform for the exchange
of monetary units is often referred to as the first cryptocurrency with commercial success,
reaching a maximum market capitalization of over $300 billion dollars in December of 2018
(Coinmarket, 2018). As of this writing, one Bitcoin is worth around $7000.
It is true that cryptocurrencies are the most popular application for the blockchain with an
estimated number of users between 2.9 and 5.9 million in 2017 (Hileman 2017). Nonetheless,
with the appearance of new blockchains, private and public, platforms such as Ethereum,
Hyperledger Fabric, Corda, Ripple, etc., are allowing for other applications to be developed on
top of the blockchain. This includes financial applications, notary services, smart contracts, and
decentralized autonomous organizations (Peters, 2015). The new developments especially
include “smart contracts” in the Ethereum blockchain (Werbach, 2019).
In this paper, we consider governance of blockchain. In the context of blockchains, the
term “governance” often refers to the management of technical implementation factors, such as
improvements to system software, or changes in the consensus mechanism. But other
governance aspects have been addressed as well; for example, Werbach (2019) describes an
attack on the Ethereum blockchain known as The DAO in which the governance process
involved rolling back transactions (essentially setting the ledger back to an earlier state). In all
cases, these governance processes involve interactions between human stakeholders. These
contracts respond to changing information in the environment by executing and enforcing (in
computer software) the terms of the contract that was defined algorithmically in advance. Thus,
blockchains and smart contracts can be seen as a Hayekian “institutional framework” in which
market mechanisms can work (Boettke, 2018). Because of the proliferation of blockchains with
different characteristics, potential market participants can “shop” across blockchains to find the
one(s) that have characteristics most suitable for the transaction(s) they hope to execute
(Alston, 2019). In essence, we see this as a realization of competitive development of
frameworks of rules, or institutions, that allow exchange (Hadfield, 2017).
We extend the analysis of blockchain governance by suggesting that a Hayekian
perspective is especially well suited to explain the spontaneous order of the blockchain but that
an Ostromian perspective on the knowledge commons is especially well suited to understand
the taxis aspect of the blockchain: the reason why blockchain anarchy is generally successful,
as well as its nested relationship to higher-level governance organizations. Together, these
perspectives can explain the limits of human ability to design institutions for innovation but also
open up the black box of institutional design within the blockchain.

Hayek amongst the Machines
Hayek (1978) contrasted organizational orders with spontaneous orders. Spontaneous orders
must be recognizable as an order and a result of purposeful human action, but are not the result
of deliberate design. Made orders (taxis) are artificial, deliberately constructed by an individual
or group of individuals. Spontaneous orders do not have an author and are not the result of a
unified plan devised and enforced by a third party, such as the state (Boettke and Coyne 2005;
Pennington 2011). Emergent orders are often challenging to control, and while behavior is
1
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governed by rules, the participants may not even be aware of them. These orders in some
instances contribute to wealth creation, but in others may be destructive (Martin and Storr,
2008).
The Blockchain, from this perspective, is a spontaneous order. It resulted from
purposeful action. There was even a single set of authors of the rules governing the blockchain
(in fact, four people who were the “authors” of Ethereum). But the blockchain itself did not have
a plan, and it has evolved in ways that reflect a market that changes as a cumulative
consequence of many independent activities. It also appears to be one that generates
substantial wealth, unlike destructive spontaneous orders, such as a mob or a riot, and may
even provide a foundation for improving governance functions of the state, such as providing
public goods and services (Munger, 2019).
Blockchain also provides insight into the foundations of exchange in the Great Society,
which has as its defining feature anonymity of interactions (Hayek 1988). Blockchain represents
a shift from trust in centralized to decentralized entities as a result of technology (Werbach
2019). Indeed, this type of trust, together with incentives stemming from gains in the consensus
algorithms, is what prompts participants to engage in peer-to-peer interactions. Nevertheless,
the question arising is whether blockchain-enabled trust is sufficient for engaging in complex
social interactions that involve the sharing of resources and assets (Pazaitis, DeFilippi, &
Kostakis, 2017).
Informal orders have the potential to behave abusively, thus markets for choice are
important. One corrective to such challenges is through Hayekian competition, or opportunities
for people to choose venues of collective decision-making or exchange (Stringham and Zywicki
2011). One of the features of blockchain is that it allows some choice of forums.
Even though there are aspects of spontaneous order for the Blockchain as an institution,
there is some role for design (Bert, Markey-Towler, Novak, and Potts 2018). The Blockchain
has within it, islands of conscious power, much like Coasean firms. But unlike the traditional
firm, which is now highly regulated and relies on the legal system, much of the blockchain is
self-governing. It is therefore useful to consider explicitly the insights of Elinor Ostrom, whose
work focused explicitly on the analysis of institutions that lead to successful self-governance in
anarchic environments, of which blockchain certainly qualifies, as well as the challenge of
separating Blockchain neatly from the state. Ostrom (2010) viewed the concepts of “market” and
“state” as too blunt and binary, which is also the idea of “entangled” political economy
approaches to blockchain, which considers the blurring of boundaries among the economic,
social, and political realms with phenomena such as “crypto-secession” and decentralization
over record-keeping functions normally provided by the government (Allen, Berg, and Novak,
2018).

Ostrom Amongst the Machines: The Knowledge
Commons
Self-governance is especially important to the blockchain and it has features of a commons. It is
also governed by institutions that provide the basis for interaction in political, socio-economic
systems, while establishing the social positions that different individuals may occupy according
2
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to their rights, obligations and empowerments to act in specific situations (Markey-Towler,
2018). Thus, it is a potentially important application of Elinor Ostrom’s (2005, 1990) early work
on the commons, which resulted in design principles for effective self-governance of commonpool resources (CPRs). These design principles focused on boundaries, the link between rules
and needs, opportunities for participation, and the design of enforcement mechanisms, as well
as the nested nature of governance.
Knowledge is not a natural resource and is not necessarily depletable, which is a key
feature of a CPR. Yet knowledge in its broadest and most general form, suggests social
dilemmas that can be addressed by commons governance, including issues of underproduction,
free riding, overconsumption and withdrawal of information, enclosure, inequitable access and
distribution, coordination among information producers and users, conflict, deception,
congestion (insufficient bandwidth at times of peak demand), pollution (Ostrom and Hess,
2007). Early adaptations of Ostrom’s work to knowledge and information resources
characterized them as “new” commons (Hess 2008).
More recently, the knowledge commons concept has been developed and applied as a
method of researching “constructed cultural commons,” a shorthand for shared resources
composed primarily of products of the human mind (Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg
2014; Strandburg, Frischmann, and Madison 2017). The characteristic that distinguishes the
“commons” from the “noncommons” is institutionalized sharing of resources among community
members (Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg 2010). One of the key aspects of the
knowledge commons as an institution are self-governance, including how self-governance can
be linked to other formal and informal governance mechanisms and the constraints on selfgovernance imposed by technology and other material constraints.
Like Ostrom’s earlier work that questioned privatization as a solution to CPR
governance, the knowledge commons literature questions simple solutions to the challenge of
governing knowledge (Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg, 2010). Successful distributed
commons governance examples, such as open source production and Wikipedia, illustrate
cases where knowledge and information are naturally shareable, and where the absence of
clear property rights does not inevitably lead to “tragedy” (Madison, Frischmann, and
Strandburg 2009). An implication is that knowledge commons research must be an empirical,
rather than conceptual, exercise (Frischmann 2013).
The knowledge commons research framework builds on Osrom’s Institutional Analysis
and Development (IAD) framework, which considers how formal and informal “rules-in-use”
constitute an action arena that influence collective outcomes for a group (Ostrom 2005). The
knowledge commons framework differs from the IAD framework in that it places less emphasis
on depletable CPRs and allows for greater historical contingency, as well as recognizes that
forms of knowledge are shaped by a variety of institutional forces, rather than nature. The
knowledge commons framework generally begins, intuitively, with the understanding that
intangible information and knowledge resources are nonrival, nondepletable public goods. The
analysis of the knowledge commons can be summarized with the following clusters of concerns
and questions (Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg 2014):
1. A detailed story of the origins, history, and operation of the commons
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2. A description of formal and informal (norm-based) rules and practices regarding
distribution and coordination of commons resources among participants, including rules
for appropriation and replenishment of commons resources
3. The institutional setting(s), including the character of the regime’s possibly being
“nested” in larger scale institutions and being dependent on the other, adjacent
institutions
4. Relevant legal regimes, including property regimes, that influence the operation of the
primarily self-governing institutions
5. The structure of interactions between commons resources and participants and
institutions adjacent to and outside the regime
6. Dispute resolution and other disciplinary mechanisms by which commons rules, norms,
and participants are policed
The next section describes key features of blockchain governance. We then show how the
framework just introduced helps to understand blockchain governance.

Blockchain Governance
Behind most implementations of blockchain we find a shared, replicated, and distributed ledger.
The main characteristic of a peer-to-peer (P2P) system is that it allows network users to transfer
(i.e., transact) digitized, valuable, and tokenized assets (e.g., cryptocurrencies) at a distance
with no need of a central trusted third party.2 To achieve this decentralization (i.e., no need of a
trusted third-party), every user in the blockchain network has a full copy of the transaction
ledger and the networked system makes sure every user’s copy reflects the current state of the
underlying data (Christidis, 2016). This distributed ledger can be seen as a secure form of a
database of records (e.g., transactions) with characteristics such as decentralization (any
transaction can be conducted in a P2P manner), persistency (all transactions are broadcast to
all users in the network), auditability (all entries are verifiable and traceable), immutability (no
registered data point can be changed or deleted), and security (all data are cryptographically
secure) (Crosby, 2016).
This secure “database” is constructed as a log of records that are batched into timestamped blocks identified by their cryptographic hash, which creates a unique identifier for each
generated block.3 The new block also contains a pointer to the hash (i.e., unique identifier) of
the previous block, also known as the parent block, creating in this manner a chain of blocks,
commonly known as the Blockchain (see Fig. 1). The first element in the chain is the genesis
block, which is a block with no parent and common to the whole network (Peters, 2015).

2

In the past, users could transfer assets face-to-face. For long distance transactions, users needed to
trust a central entity such as a Bank or the Postal Service.
3
A hash or hash value is the result of a hash function. A hash function is a mathematical algorithm that
takes an alphanumeric input to produce an alphanumeric output of a predefined length. The produced
messages have hashes that are entirely different for each different input. It is computationally infeasible to
generate two inputs that have the same output - essentially rendering the hash value unique.
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Figure 1: The Blockchain Architecture
In blockchain-based systems we usually find two main components: the transactions and
the blocks containing these transactions. The latter is further divided into the block body, and
the block header (See Fig. 2). The body of the block contains the transactions and a transaction
counter to keep track of the number of transactions to be batched into the block.4 On the other
hand, the header of the block contains additional details regarding the creation of the block. This
includes a timestamp (exact date and time of the creation of the block), a nonce (arbitrary
number to guarantee that transactions are handled only once), the parent block unique identifier
(the hash of the previous block), and the Merkle Tree Root (the hash result or fingerprint of the
transactions of the block5) (Nakamoto, 2017).

Figure 2: The Blockchain Block
Taxonomy of Blockchain Platforms
The most common way to categorize a blockchain system is according to the access rights to
the network. In this manner, blockchain-based platforms are classified into private, consortium,
or public. A public or permissionless blockchain, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, allows any user
(usually anonymously or using pseudonyms) to access the network. On the other hand, in a
private or permissioned platform, such as Hyperledger Fabric or Corda, only a limited number of
4

Different blockchain platforms allow different numbers of transactions per block. In the case of Bitcoin,
an average of 1,500 transactions are included per block (Decker, 2013).
5
Single value (i.e., hash) that results from repeatedly digesting (i.e., applying a hashing function to a
given input) pairs of transactions until there is one root hash (Gupta, 2017).
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users (usually with known identities) can access the network. This allows for identifiable users,
where older users exercise access control to the new entrants. Finally, in a consortium or hybrid
blockchain platform, instead of allowing any person to participate or allowing a single
user/company to have full access control, a few selected nodes perform the most important
functions in the network, including access control, as summarized in Table 1.
Private

Consortium

Public

Access Rights

Permissioned

Permissioned but more
flexible

Permissionless

Read Privileges

Restricted

Usually restricted

No restrictions (open)

Immutability Level

Medium

Medium

High

Efficiency

High: Low overhead
from the consensus
algorithm

High: Low overhead from
the consensus algorithm

Low: High overhead from
the consensus algorithm

Centralization

Yes

Partial

No

Consensus
Algorithm

Pre-approved by nodes

Pre-approved by nodes

PoW, PoS, DPoS,etc.

User’s identity

Known identities

Anonymous / Known
identities

Anonymous /
Pseudonyms

Digital Asset

Any

Any

Platform-native

Platform examples

Hyperledger Fabric,
Corda, etc.

Ripple, Multichain, etc.

Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.

Table 1: Blockchain Taxonomy by Access Rights
Consensus Algorithms in Blockchain
A key characteristic of the Blockchain is that it does not rely on a trusted, centralized entity (e.g.,
a central bank). Consequently, the network requires a method to ensure nodes agree on the
validity of the transactions in each block, and the order in which blocks are appended to the
chain. In case of cryptocurrencies, consensus also solves the problem of double spending.
Consensus is a critical process in blockchain; otherwise, each user in the network could have a
different view of the “state of the world” (Greenspan, 2015). To deal with this problem most
Blockchain deployments implement a distributed consensus mechanism (Bach, 2018).
Consensus algorithms are a set of rules that ensure a consistent copy of the ledger across the
network. Reaching a consensus in the Blockchain is an adaptation of the Byzantine Generals
(BG) problem.6 Nonetheless, it is necessary to point out that the implemented consensus
6

A group of Generals commanding a part of the Byzantine army have surrounded an enemy camp.
However, for an attack to be successful, the majority of the generals need to agree on whether, when,
and how to attack. Yet, there may be “traitors” trying to boycott the attack (Lamport 1982).
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mechanism in a blockchain platform depends on the type of blockchain (e.g., private vs. public),
the network configuration (e.g., known user identities), and the type of digital asset being
exchanged (e.g., cryptocurrencies). In fact, the advantages of consensus-based systems (e.g.,
resistance to censorship, immutable transaction record, etc.) also depend on the characteristics
of the blockchain-based platform (Christidis, 2016). Due to the popularity of cryptocurrencies
and the considerable amount of applications being developed on top of blockchain-based
platforms, a substantial number of consensus algorithms is being developed (Cong, 2019). In
what follows, we briefly describe the most popular algorithms in public blockchains and their
main characteristics.7
Proof of Work (PoW): This is the most widely known consensus algorithm in blockchain due to
its utilization in Bitcoin. The goal of the algorithm is to validate transactions so they can be
batched into blocks to be appended at the end of the blockchain. In order to append a new
block, each node (known as “miners” in Bitcoin) compete to show that it has performed (i.e.,
mined) some amount of work such as solving a complex mathematical puzzle.8 The first node to
solve the problem appends the block at the end of the chain while being rewarded for the mining
process. Other nodes solve the same problem, and consensus is achieved when the nodes that
reached the solution vote (by simple majority) to admit the new block to the chain (Nakamoto,
2008). The effectiveness of PoW in the face of dishonest agents was analyzed by Mylovanov
and Vohra (2019), who suggest that increasing entry costs or increasing rewards cannot create
incentives for these agents to forgo opportunism.
Proof of Stake (PoS): Born as a resource-efficient option for PoW, the main assumption of PoS
is that nodes with higher stakes in the network are less likely to harm (i.e., attack) the system. In
PoS, users with higher stakes (e.g., ownership of digital assets) have bigger chances to become
a validator (i.e., verify the correctness of a block to be attached to the chain) in the “pseudorandom” process used to select a block validator (Pîrlea, 2018).
Many alternative variations of PoS have been proposed in different blockchain-based
systems. This includes Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS), Proof of Weight (PoWeight), Leased
Proof of Stake (LPoS), etc. Further, many consensus algorithms have tried to combine the best
of two worlds. Thus, new mechanisms are being developed as a hybrid version of PoW and
PoS (e.g., Proof of Importance, Proof of Capacity, etc.). All these systems share the core
characteristics of PoW and PoS with some variations such as representative democracy,
different definitions of stake, single leader selection, among others.

Forks in Blockchain
Forks or branches are a commonly discussed topic in blockchain. From a programming
perspective, a fork is an open source modification to the code. In other words, a fork is a new
version of the rules that govern the platform. In most cases, the forked code is very similar to
the original with important modifications, where the two prongs comfortably co-exist. In the
particular case of applications of blockchain such as cryptocurrencies, a fork is usually
7

Private blockchains also implement versions of consensus algorithms, usually as adaptations of old
mechanisms used in other distributed systems (e.g., distributed computing).
8
In the particular case of Bitcoin, a node has to find a hash value that has to be less than a given target.
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implemented to introduce a fundamental change, or to create a new asset with similar
characteristics as the original. Nonetheless, it is necessary to point out that not all forks are the
result of a change in the version. Due to the distributed and decentralized nature of blockchain,
a branch can also happen accidentally. This can happen when not all nodes are replicating the
same information, time lags are introduced in the network, two nodes find a block
simultaneously, or introduced by malicious nodes (Coindesk, 2018).
In blockchain, we commonly talk about two types of forks: hard and soft (see Fig. 3).
Forks however have a shared history. In other words, the log of records on each of the chains is
usually identical prior to the split.
Soft Forks: The main characteristic of this type of fork is that newer versions can co-exist with
older versions. That is, a change in protocol (e.g., a cosmetic change or adding a new
functionality) does not affect the core structure of the platform. New blocks will be accepted by
old version nodes (i.e., nodes that are not generating blocks according to the current version of
the platform). Nonetheless, the other way around is not true. The newer version would reject
blocks created under the old version of the system. This type of amendment generally requires
only the majority of miners to upgrade (i.e., majority consensus), which makes it more feasible
and less disruptive. Finally, a key characteristic of soft forks is that they do not carry the same
potential of double-spending attacks, since both old and new nodes will read both the new and
old version blocks (Castor 2017) .
Hard forks: In this type of fork, a change to the protocol of the platform renders the older
version invalid9. In this light, if nodes continue running an older version, they will end up with a
different protocol. Consequently, nodes would have different data than the newer version, which
can lead to significant confusion and potential errors. In other words, the software upgrade is
not compatible with the older software. Hence, nodes that continue running the old version of
the software will see the new transactions as invalid. Consequently, to switch over to the new
chain and to continue appending valid blocks to the end of the chain, all of the nodes in the
network (i.e., full consensus) need to upgrade to meet the new rules (Liao, 2017).
Hard forks have recently happened in well-known public blockchain platforms such as
Ethereum and Bitcoin. It is worth mentioning a couple of examples prior to these well-publicized
splits. First, the MintPal hard fork - in 2014, the platform suffered a hack that led to a two million
USD tokens being stolen (Higgins, 2014). Due to this problem, developers of the platform
reclaimed the funds by introducing a hard fork into the chain. Also in 2014, NXT suffered a hack,
which resulted in the theft of $1.75 million dollars. In this case developers also proposed a hard
fork to recover the stolen funds, a proposal that was rejected. Instead, most of the funds were
recovered through negotiations (Isgur, 2014). These examples show the different approaches
taken by blockchain-based platforms dealing with very similar circumstances. Further, it shows
that the changes (i.e., forks) introduced in a blockchain platform are characterized by a relevant
governance mechanism.
Forking includes additional layers of complexity due to the decentralized nature of the
system. A change can be initiated by anyone who proposes an upgrade in the protocol. It only
9

As an example, in Bitcoin, a hard fork would be necessary to change defining parameters such as the
block size, the difficulty of the cryptographic puzzle, limits to additional information that can be added, etc.
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fully succeeds if the whole network accepts the new upgrade. With every fork, especially hard
forks, there is always a risk of a chain split into two halves. Hence, an owner of a cryptocoin, for
instance, would receive two new coins. Both currencies then start functioning as separate
entities (Arruñada, 2018).
As explained by Arruñada (2018), changes (i.e., splits) in decentralized systems, such
as the blockchain, drastically change the incentives with respect to those presented in
centralized ones. In blockchain, the platform architect plays a limited role: the nature of the
system is that all nodes can unilaterally determine which protocol they run, and whether they
update it or not is their decision. Consequently, the challenge for blockchain-based systems lies
in developing efficient mechanisms producing “a necessarily ‘soft’ form of governance that takes
as given the ultimately decentralized decision‐making (via potential splits); but, by promoting the
good ‘equilibria,’ ensures efficient nodes’ coordination when adapting to new circumstances.”
(Arruñada 2018).

Figure 3: Hard vs. Soft forks in Blockchain

Understanding Blockchain Governance
Based on the discussion above, we concur with Davidson, DiFillippi and Potts 2018 that
blockchains are consistent with the institutional context of economic transactions as argued by
Mises, Hayek and other Austrian economists (Boettke 2018). Transactions on blockchains are
effectively transfers of property rights within that institutional context. As we discussed above,
each blockchain may represent a somewhat different institutional context, and may (but need
not) represent an evolution (or specialization) of previously existing blockchains; new
blockchains may even begin with the same code base (computer software) of a prior blockchain
and modify it to implement the new institutional context.

9
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The process of creating a new blockchain is normally the effort of a small team of people
who then seek to have their innovation adopted by, and subsequently governed by, the
community. In most cases, the “community” consists of transaction validators (miners),
software developers, and (typically) transactors with large stakes (coins) on the chain.
Governance actions consist of validating transactions and software changes that may result in
soft or hard forks. Broadly speaking (but not necessarily), soft forks are upgrades that do not
make major changes to the institutional framework created by the blockchain, and hard forks
are the result of a change in more fundamental institutional rules.

The Story
The blockchain has features of a commons: congestion, conflict, deception and fraud, efforts to
create boundaries, and inequities in who can participate. These inequities are reflected in the
intensive demands for understanding mining activities for Bitcoin. There are currently high entry
costs and high rewards for mining, but as Mylovanov and Vorhra (2018) explain, this many not
be optimal or efficient, as resources are dissipated. Their point is an idea consistent with the
knowledge commons, which is that there might be inefficiencies in governance that cannot be
solved easily by establishing property rights. In this particular case, this is effectively a race to
extract property rights. Blockchains do not have boundaries in the usual sense of institutions
and property rights, and there is much freedom for transactors to move from one blockchain to
another10. Blockchain as an institution is governed by stakeholders (typically miners, or
validators) and aligns more closely with the knowledge commons’ move away from nondepleting resources. However, there is a clear ability to distinguish blockchains, and some are
clearly excludable. For example, permissioned blockchains can alter trust relationships between
transacting parties by restricting who may execute transactions on the chain. Thus, it is useful to
think of blockchain as a commons, but also one that is not subjected to the challenges of
divisibility.

Institutions for Distribution and Coordination
As previously mentioned, the boundaries in blockchain are akin to the knowledge commons’
move away from this concept. However, there are important distinctions between blockchains,
as Table 1 shows. What is also clear from Table 1 is that rules evolved to satisfy distributional
needs. Thus, institutional analysis of blockchains and the institutions of blockchains are highly
differentiated. Stil, there is not necessarily as much ability for people to modify rules, as there
are no “town halls” in blockchains, especially public ones . In permissioned blockchains, there is
more ability to choose, and ability to participate in the blockchain. In addition, for reasons
explained above, when there are challenges to the blockchain, the solutions involve working in
teams with humans and multiple, overlapping decision-making authority.

10

Moving from one blockchain to another is not costless. This was discussed in some detail by Alston
(Alston, 2019).
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Nested-ness
For Ostrom, the terms market and state are restrictive categories that do not include all
available forms of governance arrangements. Instead, it is more useful to refer to polycentrism,
which involves nesting of markets in higher-level organizations and networks between market
and nonmarket participants. Blockchains are nested in higher-level organizations, and there is a
blockchain interface with human elements (Werbach, 2019). Governments also regulate
blockchain, but they cannot necessarily eliminate self-governance. Blockchain moves to areas
where there is less regulatory burden (Berg, Davidson, and Potts, 2018b).

Legal Regimes and Property Rights
There is not a unified system of law governing blockchain. However, there is generalized
criminal and common law available. Some blockchains involve permission. For violations, the
enforcement would presumably come from a third-party enforcer, including the state. For
reasons noted, property rights are also fluid. There is no third party to call on to enforce property
rights. This is an additional reason why the commons metaphor is appropriate.

Interactions between Insiders and Outsiders in the Blockchain
One of the features of the blockchain is that it is relatively immune from outside interference.
The “cypherpunk” community developed the Bitcoin in part because of this feature and a desire
to exist outside of the state (Berg, Davidson & Potts 2018b). It remains challenging for outsiders
to come in and destabilize governance, as the blockchain is relatively challenging to control and
hard for outsiders to eliminate self-governance. Thus, it is an insider driven system. The
freedom from outside interference is why some may view it as a source of constraints on the
state, such as by removing challenges with corruption.

Dispute Resolution and Discipline in the Blockchain
Forking is the “dispute” in blockchain. Beyond these issues, it is clear that many disputes can be
governed by people. When there are challenges to the blockchain, the solutions involve working
in teams with humans and multiple, overlapping decision-making authorities. However, there is
not as much discipline beyond choice. However, voting with one’s feet is an important source of
discipline. Blockchain allows for local choice, and can be thought of as a crypto-democracy
(Allen et al 2018).

Conclusions
In this paper, we sought to demonstrate that the tools offered by scholars such as Hayek,
Ostrom and Buchanan provide powerful analytical tools to study blockchains. We have argued
that blockchain is best thought of as an institutional context for transactions, and a Hayekian
approach provides insight into the unfolding of blockchain and the limits of design. Order, as
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Hayek understood, need not come from Leviathan. At the same time, blockchain has rules and
features of a commons. It is also nested in a framework of government. Accordingly, it is useful
to think of blockchain in the same terms as a knowledge commons.
The Ostroms’ work and the public choice literature even suggest a role for blockchain in
strengthening the state. Elinor and Vincent Ostrom also eschewed a clear division between
“market” and “state” (Aligica 2018). James M. Buchanan (1975) divided the state into protective
and productive functions. The blockchain can both constrain and improve the effectiveness of
the state, which is a possibility in the Ostroms’ framework and even Buchanan’s perspective but
not as explicit in Hayek’s approach. In general terms, we have argued that the blockchain fits
Hayek’s spontaneous order; however, relying only on such an approach would portray the
blockchain as a mysterious black-box. Through this analysis, we have leveraged Ostroms’
insights to disentangle the different pieces that have turned blockchain into the technology that it
is today, with all its applications and potential implications for governance and the state.
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